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WHAT IS A LEGAL RELATION?
ARTHUR L. CORBIN*
With the article of Professor Clark, published in the present
issue, I am in entire agreement. The reading thereof has caused me
to make a new and careful study of Professor Kocourek's article in
the last June number of this QUARTERLY. It is not necessary here
to' dwell upon some of our points of disagreement;· instead, it is my
purpose to point out in his article some indications of mutual agree·
ment and understanding.
On page 237 we :find the following: "What is a legal relation 7
The test which seems to be advanced is that it is every situation which
is or may be procedurally asserted for a declaration or denial of
right, or for an imposition of a sanction, or any other purpose within
the scope of adjudicative action, whether well-founded or not."
With the omission of the last four words, this comes reasonably close
to my own position. Those four words, however, must be omitted.
A "situation" is not "well-founded;" nor is it "iU-founded." It
merely is. The" situation" consists of the existing facts, .already
gone into history. A predication or assertion as to how those facts
will affect the future conduct of private individuals or of societal
agents, or of the wind and waves may be "well-founded" or ill-founded.
but the facts themselves are neither. If those facts enable us to pre-
dict that Mrs. Grundy's tongue will or will not wag, we say that there
is. a moral or deportmental "relation." If they determine the future
conduct of societal agents, acting by rule on behalf of our organized
fellow-men, with respect to specific persons, we say that these persons
are in a legal relation. What makes the existing "situation" a legal
relation is that it determines societal conduct. The problem is what
will society do? A rule is a rule or law when it describes what society
will'do, either presently or conditionally. It is quite immaterial (for
present purposes) what that conduct of society will be, whether it will
be intentional action or conscious forbearance. We wish to know,
and we litigate to find out.
The learned author in his next sentence says: "This is a liberal
program which gives enormous breadth to the law." In an earlier
article he said that it might cause the law to break down of its own
weight. Agreed. But it is the truth. The law does have enormous
breadth, and it may break down of its own weight. Civilization may
become too complex to endure. It is true that our system of stated
rules cannot cover all' possible "situations," but- it is daily becoming
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more complex- and inclusive through the declarations of courts and
legislatures. We have the added complicating feature that no declara-
tion is final except as between the two litigating parties. It is daily be-
coming more difficult to advise a client. No man can know all the
law. In spite of this difficulty, it is impossible for us to restrict our
"laws" and our "law" books to those rules that assert affirmatively
that society will use "constraint." They would be adequate to in-
form us as to what will be the future societal conduct with respect to
our clients only in case they contain a complete catalog of all "situa-
tions" where society will actively use constraint. We could in such
case know, by process of exclusion, when society would not -use con-
straint. But it is impossible to prepare such a catalog. Millions of
"situations" have not yet been passed upon at all, and we do not yet
know enough to hazard a prediction or to formulate a rule. Society
is going to use constraint in many"situations" not yet covered by our
system of stated rules. Therefore, we desire to know, so far as it can
yet be shown, what are the "situations" in which society will'lwt use
constraint. A client brings his "situation" to his lawyer and asks
what will society do about it. _ The lawyer studies history and predicts
the future; he replies, societY- constrains (and you are under a duty) ;
or he replies, society does not constrain (and you have a privilege).
In either case, according to established and desirable usage, he is lay-
ing down the law and acting as a lawyer.
The learned author further says: "The present writer does not
regard the question of the name to be applied to these non-legal-content
situations as important. " Agreed, again; except that one terminology
may be more usable than another and that some agreement on termin-
ology is necessary for clear expression and correct decision. A prior·i,
it would not make a scintilla of difference whether we call certain sit-
uations legal or "non-legal." "Our chief quarrel is . . . with
the use of terminology which permits one fundamental term to be
used for three distinct and separable ideas. " It is a great satisfaction
to be quarreling on the same side and for the purp.ose of attaining the
same end. That is exactly why Hohfeld tried to limit the fundamental
term, "privilege," to mean only that society does not constrain a
specific person to conduct himself toward another in a specified way.
He did not use it in the threefold sense of "(1) Liberty; (2) Privi-
lege; and (3) Power;" either as those three-terms are defined by others
or as he defined them himself. We do not maintain either that his
usage is the necessary usage or that others do not use the term in a
threefold sense.
A legal relation is not a thing; nor does it have "content," ex-
cept in the most figurative sense (and in legal discussion figures of
speech may be very inaccurate and misleading). Every human be-
ing finds himself amidst ever-changing combinations of facts. These
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combinations affect the conduct of other human beings. Experience
has shown that they affect this conduct with more or less uniformity,
and hence in accordance with more or less well-defined rules. Conduct
can, therefore, be predicted with some degree of accuracy by men of
judgment and experience. Men group themselves togther by the
million and become known as a society or the state. They choose
agents and officers to act in certain matters for them as such society
or state. In other matters they react only as individuals, and not
as a society through appointed agents. A person needs to know both
how this combination of facts w.ill affect the conduct of societal agents
and how it will affect the conduct of private individuals. As to the
first, he is in the field of what we call legal relation; as to the second,
he is in the field of morality, fashion, or whatnot. He may be in all
these fields at once, in various relations of all sorts, by virtue of the
same combination of facts.
Must the predictable conduct of societal agents be constraining
action in order that a legal relation may exist? Not at all. "Where
is the proof of that?" Professor Kocourek asks. There is no "proof"
of it, and there can be none. Likewise, it is not possible to furnish
"proof" that constraint is necessary to the existence of a legal rela-
tion. It is a mere matter of choosing a definition and adopting a .
usage, not of discovering the invariable elements of an unchangable
quantity. But when one asserts that by prevailing usage the term
"legal relation" includes Hohfeld's "right, power, privilege, and im-
munity, " or asserts that such usage and definition would be the most
convenient and clearly expressive, such assertion is in need of "proof. "
I make the assertion; but for the present the proof must consist of
nothing more than an appeal to experiment and to experience. That
a system" continues to prosper" is some evidence.
